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Smith: Must a Private Hospital be a Good Samaritan?
NOTES

MUST A PRIVATE HOSPITAL BE A GOOD SAMARITAN?
Suddenly John Doe is hit by blinding pain. Doe knows "General
Hospital," like other hospitals in the city, has an emergency room,
but from the name he has no idea "General" is, in fact, a private
hospital. Doe, with great difficulty and expenditure of precious time,
makes his way to the emergency room of "General." The crucial
question that will be examined in this note then arises-does the
hospital owe an affirmative duty to aid the stricken Doe? Must it be
a good Samaritan or can it callously turn him away with impunity?
Although this note is concerned mainly with the duty of hospitals
to aid in emergencies, the general state of the law concerning affirmative duty to aid one in peril will be examined to some extent.
COMMON LAW AND

DUTY To Am

One of the most basic concepts imbedded in the common law of
torts is the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Misfeasance occurs when a person actively does something which causes
damage to another. Nonfeasance has been described as the absence of
a plus quantity., That is, the actor does not make the situation any
worse; he merely fails to do anything to improve it.
The common law has been very slow to impose affirmative duties
and thereby recognize liability for nonfeasance.2 Generally, there is
no duty to aid someone in distress so long as the potential rescuer
has not negligently caused the distress.) Probably the main reason
affirmative duties have not been imposed is the strong individualistic
philosophy inherent in the common law. A feeling exists that such an
imposition of duty is an unwarranted limitation on freedom and that
a man should not be forced to be unselfish4 As society has grown
more and more interdependent, exceptions to this general rule of no
duty to aid have been recognized. These exceptions are generally
based upon some special relationship between the parties: carriers
1. Bohlen, Moral Duty To Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA.
L. Rav. 217 (1908).
2. PRoss.R, TORTS 334 (3d ed. 1964). It has been suggested that the reason nonfeasance was never made a general basis for liability in the early common law
was that the law had its hands full just trying to punish acts of misfeasance and
that there was no time to worry with nonfeasance. Note, The Failure To Rescue:
A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 631 (1952).
3. RFsrATEMENT, TORTS §314 (1934). It should be noted that some recent
cases have found there was a duty to aid if defendant's instrument injured the
plaintiff although defendant was not negligent. L. S. Ayres Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind.
86, 40 NE.2d 334 (1942).
4. Note, The Failure To Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUm. L. REv.
631 (1952).
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may owe a duty to aid passengers in peril, 5 innkeepers may owe a duty
to aid guests,6 merchants may owe a duty to aid invitees. 7 Well recogniied is the principle that even in situations in which no duty is
owed, if aid is undertaken due care must be used in rendering that
aid.8
The traditional common law view regarding duty to aid in peril
is exemplified by the case of Union Pacific Ry. v. Cappier.9 There
the train of the defendant, without fault, struck and killed a trespasser on the railroad right-of-way. 10 The court held that since the
railroad was not negligent in hitting the deceased, it owed no duty
to aid him. The court then concluded with the oft quoted passage:"
With the humane side of the question courts are not concerned. It is the omission or negligent discharge of legal duties
only which come within the sphere of judicial cognizance.
For witholding relief from the suffering, for failure to respond
to the calls of worthy charity, or for faltering in the bestowment of brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are found
not in the laws of men, but in that higher law, the violation of
which is condemned by the voice of conscience, whose sentence
of punishment for the recreant act is swift and sure.
The 1957 case of Yania v. Bigan12 illustrates the extreme situations
in which the general common law doctrine will still be applied. In
Yania the deceased was a business guest of the defendant. The defendant enticed the deceased to jump into deep water and then stood
by and watched his guest drown. The court held the defendant had
no duty to aid the drowning man.' 3
With this brief background of common law duty in mind, the
particular problem of the duty of a hospital to aid in an emergency
comes into focus.

5.
6.

Yazoo & Miss. V. R.R. v. Byrd, 89 Miss. 308, 42 So. 286 (1906).
Texas Hotel Co. v. Cosby, 131 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).

7. Connelly v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 349 Pa. 261, 37 A.2d 125 (1944).
8.

Slater v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 209 Fed. 480 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1911).

9. 72 Pac. 281 (Kan. 1903).
10. It should be noted that some employees of the defendant did try to help.

Plaintiff sued claiming defendant owed a duty to aid and that defendant did not
undertake to act fast enough.
11. Id. at 282.

12. 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959).
13. For a discussion and criticism of the case see Seavey, I Am Not My
Guest's Keeper, 13 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1960).
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HOSPITAL

DuTy

The duty of a private 4 hospital to admit patients is apparently
the same whether it is a proprietary or charitable hospital.25 Considering the general common law discussed above it is not surprising
the view arose that, absent a statute, a private hospital is under no
duty to serve everyone who applies.16 There are few reported cases
in which a hospital has refused to admit a patient in an emergency.
One case that did face the problem was Birmingham Baptist
Hospital v. Crews.'7

In this 1984 case the plaintiff took his young

daughter, ill with diphtheria, to the defendant hospital. The house
doctor took the child into the emergency room, but nothing was
said about acceptance for full service. Some aid was given, then
the doctor told the plaintiff to remove the child because the hospital
did not admit patients with contagious diseases. The plaintiff
wrapped the child in a blanket and took her in his car back home
where she died fifteen minutes later.
The Alabama Supreme Court held the private hospital corporadon had no duty to accept any patient and need assign no reason for
its refusal. Further, the court found the hospital did not become liable
to give full aid just because it gave some aid. The court found the
only fair inference was that the hospital undertook only emergency
aid and nothing more. In dicta other cases had reached the same
5
conclusion.'
Several later cases considered the problem of hospital liability after
some treatment had been undertakenJ'a In Bourgeois v. Dade Coun-

14. "Private hospital" as used here means all hospitals other than public
hospitals. Public hospitals are owned and operated by the government and are
supported by public funds. Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204,
205 N.Y. Supp. 554, alfd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1924).
15. 2 HosPrrAL LAw MANUAL 8b (1959). There can, of course, be problems
of charitable immunity. Admission to public hospitals is governed by the statute
creating the hospital. For example, FLA. STAT. §155.16 (1963) provides that all
county hospitals established under that chapter "shall be for the benefit of the
inhabitants of such county and of any person falling sick or being injured within
its limits... : It has been suggested that even if a person has no statutory right
to admission, still, if that person is in need of immediate attention, governmental
hospitals owe the same duty as charitable and proprietary hospitals. 2 HosPrrAL
LAw MANUAL 10 (1959).

16. Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946); Van Campen v.
Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554, aff'd, 239 N.Y. 615,
147 N.E. 219 (1924).
17. 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934).
18. Olander v. Johnson, 258 Ill.
App. 89, 99 (1930); McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 435, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
19. New Biloxi Hosp. v. Frazier, 245 Miss. 185, 146 So. 2d 882 (1962); Barcia
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ty, 2 ° a 1957 Florida case, the patient was found unconscious and

brought to the defendant hospital's emergency room. An intern,
noting the injured man reeked of alcohol, made a superficial clinical
examination then turned the man over to the police, apparently
concluding he was merely drunk. The injured man was found dead
the next morning, in his jail cell, broken ribs having punctured his
chest cavity. The Florida Supreme Court, reversing a directed verdict
for the defendant, held that under the circumstances there was evidence the intern was negligent in his examination and remanded the
case for a jury trial. From this it would appear that even though
there is no duty to admit, if the hospital does undertake to treat the
patient, even to give a cursory examination, it must use due care in
giving the emergency treatment or examination. This due care includes refraining from negligently discharging the patient.
The 1960 case of O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital21 expanded this
doctrine to cover even the slightest undertaking by the hospital. In
O'Neill the plaintiff's husband awoke early in the morning with
severe chest pains. With his wife's aid he walked several blocks to
the emergency room of the defendant private hospital. He told the
nurse of his pains and that he thought he was having a heart attack
and wanted to see a doctor. When the nurse learned he was a member
of a certain hospital insurance plan she refused to admit him because the hospital did not take people covered by that plan. The
nurse did undertake to telephone a doctor who worked for the plan
and the man talked to the doctor on the phone. The wife again requested that her husband be examined but the nurse refused. The
stricken man then walked back home and immediately suffered a
fatal heart attack. In a wrongful death action the appellate division
reversed a directed verdict for the hospital and ordered a new trial,
holding that it was a question of fact whether the nurse in calling the
doctor was doing so as a personal favor or whether the nurse was
trying to discharge her duty as an agent of the hospital and did so inadequately. The court seemed willing to go to great length to find
that the nurse might have undertaken to act as an agent of the hospital in order to allow recovery for negligence. By basing liability on
the undertaking to treat, the court was able to avoid the ultimate
question whether the hospital had a legal duty to treat the man.
In 1961 a very significant decision was rendered in the case of
v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 39 Misc. 2d 526, 241 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1963);
Jones v. New York Hosp., 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1954), reversed on other
grounds, 286 App. Div. 825, 143 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1955); Methodist Hosp. v. Ball, 50
Tenn. App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475 (1961).
20. 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957).
21. 11 App. Div. 2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960).
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Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove- in which it was held that
a hospital with an emergency room may owe a duty to admit in an
unmistakable emergency. There a baby had been sick for several
days, and when the family doctor could not be reached the Manloves
presented the child for admission at the emergency room of the
defendant private hospital. The Manloves explained to the nurse on
duty that the child had not slept for two nights, that he had a high
fever and told her that their family doctor had been treating the
child. The nurse explained that the hospital could not treat the baby
because there was danger that any medicine given by the hospital
might conflict with medicine previously prescribed by the family
doctor. The baby was not coughing or crying, and the nurse did not
examine him at all. After the nurse suggested they return the next
day when the pediatric clinic was open, the Manloves returned home
where the baby died a short time later of bronchial pneumonia. In
a wrongful death action the parents claimed the hospital was negligent
for failing to render emergency aid. The trial court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment finding that defendant could be
liable for refusing to render reasonable aid in an emergency because
it was a quasi-public institution. The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed, but rejected the quasi-public institution rationale. Although
the court conceded that a private hospital was under no common law
duty to serve everyone, it concluded this rule applies only to general
admissions and not to emergency ward admissions. After noting that
the private hospital was under no duty to maintain an emergency
24
ward,23 the court concluded:
If a person, seriously hurt, applies for such aid at an emergency ward, relying on the established custom to render it, is
it still the right of the hospital to turn him away without any
reason? In such a case, it seems to us, such a refusal might well
result in worsening the condition of the injured person, because
of the time lost in a useless attempt to obtain medical aid.
Such a set of circumstances is analogous to the case of the
negligent termination of gratuitous services, which creates a
tort liability. Restatement, Law of Torts, "Negligence," §
323 ....
[We are of opinion that liability on the part of a hospital
may be predicated on the refusal of service to a patient in case
22. 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961). Comments on this case appeared in the following
law reviews: 62 CoLum. L. REv. 730 (1962); 14 STAN. L. REv. 910 (1962); 40 TEXAs
L. Rav. 732 (1962); 31 U. CiNO. L. Ray. 183 (1962); 64 W. VA. L. REv. 234 (1962).
23. Cf., Taylor v. Baldwin, 362 Mo. 1224, 247 S.W.2d 741, 751 (1952).
24. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 139 (Del. 1961).

(Emphasis added.)
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of an unmistakable emergency, if the patient has relied upon
a well-established custom of the hospital to render aid in such
a case.
Acknowledging that it will often be a nurse who must ultimately
decide if a manifest emergency exists, the court remanded the case
to determine whether an experienced nurse should have realized
there was such an emergency.
Apparently no cases have arisen since Manlove so it is not yet
clear to what extent it will be adopted. A limited survey conducted
in the San Francisco area several years ago showed that most private
hospitals having emergency rooms treat emergency cases anyway, and
many of the hospitals thought there had always been a legal duty to
aid in an emergency.25 This probably explains why there is a
scarcity of cases.
SUPPORT FOR THE

Manlove

DEcISION

The Manlove court noted there was a dearth of direct precedent
on which to base its decision. There are several tort theories and
public policy considerations, however, on which the Manlove decision
can be supported and justified. First, the decision could be justified
on a reliance theory. Although the contrary has been asserted, 26 it
appears that the Manlove court required reliance upon the wellestablished custom to render aid in emergency situations before li2
ability would attachY.
This reliance in the hospital situation is
somewhat analogous to the reliance in the railroad crossing cases
such as Erie R.R. v. Stewart.28 There the railroad had for some
years voluntarily kept a watchman at a busy crossing to warn drivers.
The plaintiff knew the railroad maintained such a watchman, and
he relied on the absence of the watchman as meaning that the crossing
was safe. In fact, the watchman had failed to warn, and the plaintiff
was injured when struck by the train. The circuit court affirmed
the trial court's charge to the jury that the unexplained absence of a
watchman where one had been long maintained was negligence as a
matter of law. The court concluded that if the railroad has led the
traveler into reliance by voluntarily providing a service, it then cannot negligently perform the service or abandon it without notice.29
25.

14

STAN.

L. REV. 910 n.38 (1962).

26. 14 STAN. L. REV. 910 (1962).
27. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 139 (Del. 1961).
28. 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 843 (1930).
29. It is interesting to note that the concurring judge would have held the
railroad liable whether or not the traveler actually relied because the railroad
could reasonably foresee that anyone is likely to rely upon the giving of the
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The reliance doctrine is embodied in section 825 of the Restatement of Torts.30 The comment interpreting section 325 notes that
the undertaking to act or render services can be by an express promise
or by a course of conduct that the actor should have realized would
lead the other reasonably to believe that the service would be rendered. The comment also indicates that the defendant would be
liable only for damages caused by the reliance.31
Another theory for sustaining the Manlove decision is that the
hospital negligently terminated its gratuitous services. The Manlove
court analogized the emergency ward situation to section 323 of the
Restatement of Torts, 32 which makes the actor liable for bodily harm
caused when he discontinues his gratuitous services leaving the party
in a worse position. It could be reasoned that by continuously operating the emergency ward, ostensively open to all people, the hospital was undertaking a positive act, and when it refused its services
it was engaging in active misconduct that worsened the sick child's
condition and made the hospital liable for discontinuing its services.
A third possible basis of liability would be that the hospital was
a quasi-public entity. The trial court in Manlove noted that the
hospital had been receiving government subsidies and tax exemptions.
warnings. In a similar case the California Supreme Court said that once the railroad has undertaken to warn travelers it must use reasonable care to be sure the
appearance of safety does not create a trap for persons relying on it. Startup v.
Pacific Elec. Ry., 29 Cal. 2d 866, 180 P.2d 896 (1947).
For application of this doctrine in different factual situations see Abresch v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 246 Minn. 408, 75 N.W.2d 206 (1956) (telephone company could be liable if it voluntarily undertook to relay messages and led others
to rely on the undertaking and then failed to convey a message); Kurzweg v.
Hotel St. Regis Corp., 309 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1962) (voluntarily supplied doorman
failed to act and plaintiff, relying on the doorman, was struck by a taxi).
30. RSTATEmENT, TORTS §325 (1934). "One who gratuitously undertakes with
another to do an act or to render services which he should recognize as necessary
to the other's bodily safety and thereby leads the other in reasonable reliance
upon the performance of such undertaking (a) to refrain from himself taking the
necessary steps to secure his safety or from securing the then available protective
actions by third persons, or (b) to enter upon a course of conduct which is
dangerous unless the undertaking is carried out, is subject to liability to the other
for bodily harm resulting from the actor's failure to exercise reasonable care to
carry out his undertaking." For a statement of the reliance doctrine see Seavey,
Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HAv. L. REv. 913, 928
(1951).
31. The comment indicates that the hospital would be liable only to the
extent to which any alternative protection, which the reliance has caused the injured person to forego, would have been effective. Thus, it would seem that if
an injured person came to the emergency room, was refused service, and died
before he could have reached another hospital (if he had gone directly there in
the first place), then the refusing hospital would not be liable.
32. REsrATEmENT, TORTS §323 (1934).
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Because the government aid met a public need and promoted the
public welfare, the court reasoned that the subsidies were for the
benefit of the whole community, and therefore, a duty should be imposed on the hospital to render aid to all in an emergency. 3 3 Because
this conclusion is based primarily on moral and policy considerations,
a duty is imposed without the necessity of finding reliance or the
termination of active service. Furthermore, this argument would
cover many hospitals, since government aid of some sort is very
common today. Although this rationale was rejected by the Delaware
Supreme Court, other jurisdictions might adopt this theory to establish a duty.
It has been suggested that maintaining an emergency room could
be said to be an open invitation to those in need of immediate attention so that all coming are "invitees."' 34 This does not seem too
farfetched especially in the case of a "profit" hospital because presumably such a hospital expects to make money on its services. The
hospital may owe a duty to an invitee as indicated by some cases
such as Depue v. Flatau.- There the plaintiff came to the defendant's
farm late in the evening to buy cattle. Defendant invited the plaintiff to stay for supper. After the meal plaintiff became violently ill,
but allegedly defendant refused to allow plaintiff to stay overnight.
Plaintiff was obviously too weak to take care of himself; nevertheless,
defendant helped plaintiff to his sleigh, threw the reins over the sick
man's shoulders and started the horses. Plaintiff was found a short
distance from defendant's house the next morning, almost frozen.
Plaintiff sued for damages caused by defendant's alleged negligent
and wrongful conduct in refusing accommodations and sending plaintiff out in his condition.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, reversing a dismissal and apparently making no distinction between business and social guests,
held that someone entering by invitation is entitled to a higher
degree of care than those who are present by sufferance. The court
found that under the circumstances a duty arose and the plaintiff
should not have been sent out into the cold in his condition. The
case was sent back to let the jury decide if the defendant neglected
the duty owed the plaintiff.
Depue would not require that the person be taken in, only that
an invited person not be removed in an unreasonable manner, es33. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18 (Super. Ct.
1961), afJ'd, 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
34.

2

HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL 5 (1959). It is not clear whether a serious emer-

gency case entering a hospital would have an invitee or licensee status. The duty
owed is at least that owed a licensee and may be equal to that owed an invitee.
35. 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907).
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pecially when the person is under disability. However, if the emergency room constitutes an invitation and a person arrives who is
manifestly a serious emergency case, it might be argued that there is
no way a hospital could reasonably remove him. Even if the ill or
injured man is carefully placed in an ambulance and dispatched across
town to another hospital, the action could be just as wrong as starting
Depue out into the cold in his sleigh. Such a removal seems particularly unreasonable since the hospital should be able to render
medical aid in most instances with little inconvenience.
GENERAL AFFIRMATIVE DUTY

As indicated above there are several grounds based on conventional tort concepts on which the imposition of duty in the Manlove
situation could be justified. These grounds could all be characterized
as special exceptions to the general common law view that there is
no duty to aid in an emergency. A final solution to the problem,
which would avoid the limitations and strained analogies of some of
these grounds, would be to impose a general legal duty to take
affirmative action to aid in emergencies, basing such duty on sound
public policy and moral and humanitarian considerations. This duty
might be placed only upon hospitals, or it could be imposed on everyone. For many years there has been a violent outcry against the
failure of the common law to impose a duty to rescue or aid persons
in distress. 36 It is interesting to note that Illinois has felt that in the
situation involving hospitals, public policy considerations are strong
enough to warrant imposing upon certain private hospitals a statutory duty to treat in an emergency. The Illinois statute states that all
public and private hospitals where surgical operations are performed
shall not refuse emergency treatment or first aid in case of injury or
acute medical condition when refusal is likely to cause death or
serious illness or injury.37 The failure to aid is made a misdemeanor
punishable by fine. 3 8 Also a Pennsylvania statute seems to imply that
all hospitals that receive payments for care of indigents must render
emergency aid.39

36. E.g., Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97 (1908); Bohlen, Moral
Duty To Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217 (1908);
Seavey, I Am Not My Guest's Keeper, 13 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1960); Note, Moral
Challenge to the Legal Doctrine of Rescue, 14 ClEv.-MaR. L. REv. 354 (1965).
37. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 %/, §86 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964).
38. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 %, §87 (Smith-Hurd 1954). The fine ranges from
$50 to $200. Presumably violation of this statute would also give rise to civil
liability.
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §435 (1964).
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It is informative to look to other countries to see how the problem of affirmative duty to aid in emergencies is handled. The German
Criminal Code section 330 (c) imposes a general affirmative duty as
follows: 40

Whoever in case of accident or general emergency or danger
does not furnish aid, even though aid is necessary and according
to circumstances to be expected, in particular if aid is possible
without substantial personal danger and without the need to
violate other important duties, is subject to punishment in
prison up to one year or fine.
This statute obviously applies to everyone, including hospitals, and
has been used mostly against doctors and drivers who failed to aid
in emergencies on the highway. 41 Apparently, as interpreted, it makes
no difference that the aid would have been ineffective, at least unless
the person in peril was already dead or the actor knew beforehand
that his aid would be futile. 42 It is not clear from the cases how much
personal risk an aider is expected to assume under this statute. 43 Apparently no German case has allowed civil liability to be based on
section 330 (c), 44 but civil liability could be imposed under section 823
45
of the civil code.

In France an affirmative duty statute was first passed under pressure from the Nazis during the occupation in World War 11.46 After
the war this provision not only was retained but was extended in
scope and now provides imprisonment up to three years and fine up to
50,000 francs for anyone who "voluntarily abstains from giving to
a person in peril assistance that he can give without risk to himself
or to third persons either by his own action or by securing aid."47
In France the amount of risk that a rescuer must incur again is unclear. However, the courts have held that the criminal statute is the
basis for civil liability, and this result has the strong support of leading French tort authorities.

48

40. STRAFrESMZBUCH, art. 330 (c) (Ger. 1870 as amended in 1935).
41. Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L.
REv. 1073 (1961).
42. Id. at 1106 n.79.
43. Id. at 1103.
44. Id. at 1107.
45. BURGERLICHES GESEZBUCH §823, 12. Apparently if §330(c) is interpreted
as being for the protection of individuals and not just for the protection of society as a whole, then it can give rise to civil liability under §823.
46. Note, The Failure To Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L. REv.
631, 639-40 (1952).
47. Dawson, supra note 41, at 1106 n.78. The provision is found in the
FRENCH PENAL CODE art. 63, 12.
48. Id. at 1107-08.
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Criminal statutes similar to the German and French provisions
are found in the law of most of the Western European countries and
some other countries. For example, an affirmative duty to aid in an
emergency is imposed by the Dutch, Italian, Polish, Danish, Rumanian, Norwegian, Portuguese and Turkish codes.4 9 In 1961 article 422
was added to the Belgian Penal Code establishing a duty to rescue
persons exposed to serious danger.50 The Soviet code has been noted
as being not as unequivocal as the Belgian, French, German, Swiss
or other western codes.51 The Russian Penal Code specifies duties
in particular circumstances including the duty of a doctor, and maybe
others, to give medical aid when a failure might have serious consequences. 52 The Cuban Code of Social Defense of 1938 provides that
a doctor can be suspended from practice for five days to six months
if, when there is a grave risk of life, he should refrain from serving
without any reasonable and just cause. 53
This brief survey shows that many of the countries of the western
world impose a duty carrying criminal, and in some instances, civil
liability to take affirmative action to aid someone in peril. Most of
these countries impose the duty not only on doctors and hospitals
but on everyone. Noted authors have pointed out that the" absence
of a general affirmative duty in our law creates serious discrepencies
between legal and moral duties. 54 Ames maintained that the early
common law rejected moral bases of action but that the trend for
the last 600 years has been to bring law more into harmony with
49. The following materials are all taken from Dawson, supra note 41, at
1105 n.76: THE DUTCH PENAL CODE art. 450 (1881) as early as 1886 imposed
affirmative duties and now provides for fine or impairment for three months for
anyone who fails to act when another is "'in danger of death'" and aid could be
given "'without reasonable fear of danger to himself'" and the person in distress
dies. For English translation see SEAVEY, KEETON & KEETON, CASES ON TORTS 157
(1957); ITALIAN CIUMINAL CODE art. 593 imposes a duty to aid someone "'wounded
or otherwise in peril'"; THE POLISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 247 imposes a duty
"'in a situation directly endangering life' "; under the DANISH CRIMINAL CODE
art. 253 a duty arises if there is an "'evident peril to life' "; under the RUMANIAN
CRIMINAL CODE art. 489 a duty is owed someone "'in danger of death' "; the NORWEGIAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 389 creates a duty if someone is in "'evident and
immediate danger of death' "; the PORTUGUESE CRIMINAL CODE art. 2368 applies
only when the injured has been "'attacked with violence' "; criminal liability is
imposed in the TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 476 for refusing to aid someone
"'wounded or otherwise in danger of his life."'
50. 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 66 (1962).
51. Id. at 68 n.6 (g).
52. Note, supra note 46, at 637. The Russian provision is found in the PENAL
CODE OF THE R.S.FS.R. art. 157 (1934).
53. C6DIGo DE DE ENSA SOCIAL, CUBA art. 407 (1938).
54. McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1287,
1289 (1949).
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morals. 55 Bohlen maintained that legal duties today merely embody
crude conceptions of morals and ethics prevalent at an early stage in
civilization in the King's Courts.5 6 Minor contended that moral obligation is to a large extent the ultimate basis of all our law and that
the ultimate guiding light is always our idea of right and wrong. 57
Over fifty years ago Ames proposed a rule to impose affirmative
duties, which he submitted should be declared either by statute or by
the courts. 58 His rule embodies generally what is contained in most
of the European codes.
In spite of this outcry for recognition of a general duty to aid one
in peril the common law still doggedly rejects such a duty. Various
reasons have been advanced for not recognizing such a duty. First,
it has been said that standards would be hard to set. Thus it would
be hard for courts, much less the person faced with the perilous
situation, to tell when a duty would be imposed. But the drawing of
lines is the business of the courts. If our courts refused to draw thin
lines we would have no workable system of law.59 It has been suggested that reasonably prudent man standards could be applied in
assessing the gravity of the peril, the danger to the potential aider or
rescuer, and the chances of success of the aid in deciding if a duty
arose. 60
A second reason advanced for not imposing affirmative duty is
that if several people witness the peril there is no way to say which
one is liable. But why should not all of them be liable unless they
reasonably believed there was no serious danger, and they might so
believe if one of them had undertaken to render aid?61
After clearing away the problems with the administration of an
affirmative duty rule, problems, which in the main, appear to be imaginary horribles created by extreme hypotheticals, we get to the more
55. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908).
56. Bohlen, Moral Duty To Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U.
PA. L. REV. 316, 335 (1908).
57. Minor, The Moral Obligation as a Basis of Liability, 9 VA. L. REV. 420, 421

(1923).
58. Ames, supra note 55, at 113. The rule was as follows: "one who fails to
interfere to save another from impending death or great bodily harm, when he
might do so with little or no inconvenience to himself, and the death or great
bodily harm follows as a consequence of his inaction, shall be punished criminally
and shall make compensation to the party injured or to his widow and children
in case of death."
59. Note, Moral Challenge to the Legal Doctrine of Rescue, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L.
REV. 334, 350-51 (1965).

60. Note, supra note 46, at 643.
61.

Note, Moral Challenge to the Legal Doctrine of Rescue, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L.
(1965); Note, The Failure To Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52

REV. 334, 351

CoLUM. L. REV. 631, 643 (1952).
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basic objections. One is that affirmative duty is a form of slavery
that is against the Anglo-American individualistic tradition62 and is
even a form of socialism.8 3 This argument seems hard to support unless we are ready to admit that most of the countries of the western
world, other than those using the Anglo-American system, have systems of law that impose a form of slavery. After all, affirmative duty
survived the purification of Nazi law in France and Germany after
World War II, and, as noted above, a greater affirmative duty is imposed in most of the democratic countries of Western Europe than
in Russia. It is hard to believe that any great burden would be imposed by requiring simple acts to aid one in peril if those acts do not
materially endanger the aider. It cannot be denied that our society
is growing evermore interdependent, and it is doubtful whether we
can long continue to afford the legacy of unrestricted individualism
which comes to us from the Middle Ages.
A final argument often raised is that the law should not enforce
unselfishness. This argument would seem to be the conclusion to
the ultimate question we are trying to answer. The answer must lie
in a balancing of interests 4 and it seems the slight burden imposed
on individualism is more than overbalanced by our deep beliefs in the
importance of each individual and the sanctity of human life. Harper
and James admit that arguments based on preservation of individualistic values deserve great weight in our society, but express the belief
that these values can be sufficiently protected from undue encroachment by using, but carefully limiting, the Ames rule.65
These then are the arguments for and against imposing general
affirmative duties to aid. If we are not ready to accept such general
duties, it seems the time is ripe to impose upon hospitals a legal
duty to aid in emergencies. There certainly can be no risk of personal
danger to the hospital that undertakes to aid. The recognition of
the manifest emergency could be based on reasonable man standards
as the Manlove court apparently did with regard to the nurse. The
financial burden on the hospitals should not be great. After all,
emergency aid would be required only until the patient could reason-

62.

Hale, Prima Fade Torts, Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L.

REv. 196, 214 (1946).
63. Minor, supra note 57, at 422.
64. Note, Moral Challenge to the Legal Doctrine of Rescue, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L.
REv. 334, 351 (1965).
65. 2 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS §18.6, at 1049 (1956). If the affirmative duties

to aid persons in peril were imposed, it would seem essential that the rescuer not
be held to as high a standard of care as usual in the performance of his duty.
Possibly the rescuer should only be liable for gross negligence or intentional wrongs
committed during the rescue.
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ably be moved. Many patients could pay their own bills and pro66
visions could be made for the state to pay for indigents.
CONCLUSION

Whether a private hospital, which has an emergency room, has
a legal duty to admit someone when there is a manifest emergency is
still not clear. To what extent Manlove will be followed is not known.
It is interesting to note that very recently the Third District Court
of Appeal of Florida appeared to approve the Manlove decision in
dictum. 67 If the Manlove decision was based on a reliance theory as
an exception to the general rule of no affirmative duty, it can be
argued that it does not go far enough - that a more general duty to
aid should be recognized, that the requirement of reliance is too much
of a limitation. It has been pointed out, however, that this reliance
doctrine could be extended to all cases in which a person holds
himself out as one who normally provides emergency services to the
sick and injured. 68 Thus, a hospital without an emergency ward
or an ambulance service or a doctor in his office could have a duty
in emergency situations, but only, of course, if the plaintiff could
show reliance on the custom of giving aid. To avoid liability it
would have to be made absolutely clear emergncy aid would not be
given. Harper and James suggest that with the growth of exceptions
to the general rule of no duty the courts may soon approach the Ames
9
rule previously discussed.6
Ultimately, the best solution in the emergency situation might be
to impose the duty on hospitals directly based on social and humanitarian considerations rather than worry with the limitations and
vagueness of the special exceptions. The time may have come for
imposing a general duty on everyone to aid in an emergency in
which bodily harm is threatened, so long as there is no great risk
to the rescuer, as has been done in many countries of the western
world and has been advocated by some of our distinguished legal
authorities.
In any event the Manlove decision is commendable and the result
there reached should be followed at least as far as it goes. The increasing interdependence of the world today makes the result socially
66. It should be noted that there might be problems involved with a system
whereby the state paid for indigents. For example, the taxpayers' money would
in some cases be used to take care of out-of-state indigents. However, this certainly is not an insoluble problem.
67. Le Juene Rd. Hosp. Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 n.5 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1965). A comment on this case appears in 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 652 (1965).
68. 14 STAN. L. REV. 910, 917-18 n.42 (1962).
69. HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 65, § 18.6, at 1049.
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desirable. Although most hospitals probably accept all emergency
cases, still an unequivocal legal duty should be imposed to quiet all
doubts. A stricken person should never be left to take his chances
that a given hospital is a Samaritan or a Levite. Our law must grow
and change with the times. Moral and humanitarian conceptions of
duty that find a permanent place in the convictions of a society must
necessarily influence the legal obligation concepts of the law.70 The
thoughts of Bohlen written fifty-seven years ago are particularly
7
poignant and a fitting close: '
The great merit of the common law lies in its flexibility, and
this flexibility exhibits itself, not merely in its ability to adapt
old conceptions to new facts, but to absorb and apply what is
[I]t
settled and permanent in economic and ethical ideas ....
too
lags
law
which
of
a
system
that
be
forgotten
not
should
far behind the universally received conceptions of abstract
justice, in the end must lose the sympathy, the confidence, perhaps even the respect of the community.
[-U]nless they [the courts] adopt as legal those popular
standards which they themselves, as men, regard as just and
socially practicable, but which, as judges, they refuse to recognize solely because they are not the standards of the past of
Brian, of Rolle, of Fineux, and of Coke; they will more and
more lose their distinctive common law character as part of the
machinery whereby free men do justice among themselves.
[If the courts continue arbitrarily to administer an irksome
discipline the people will yield] only until their dissent grows
so strong as to impel them to demand from their legislative
representatives recognition of their views.
KELLY SMITH

70. Bohlen, supra note 56, at 334-35.
71.

Id. at 336-38.
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